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Why Perform Hazards Assessment?
Hazard assessment is required by NASA 
safety policy
H2 amounts > 10,000 lbs [OSHA Mandatory]
Best practice per AIAA Guide [NASA Direction]
Assessment methodology is specifically designed 
for H2 hazards assessment
¾ Identify hazards and evaluate risk
¾Methodology for thorough documentation
¾Based on Guide for Hydrogen Hazards Analysis on 
Components and Systems  (WSTF-IR-1117-001-08)
Why Perform Hazards Assessment?
Systematically and objectively:
– Identify hazards
– Look at consequences
– Evaluate risk
– Identify mitigations
– Document and 
communicate
– Provide mechanism for 
control of hazards
Use to: 
– Improve designs
– Evaluate safety
– Analyze failures
Formal Assessment:
– Obtain management 
“buy-in” and oversight
– Written documentation
– Reference for operations
Hazard assessment coupled with expert review 
is a primary component of best practice.
Applications for Hazard Assessment
May be applied at all stages in a 
system’s existence:
¾Initial concept
¾Design review
¾Operations
¾Modifications to design or operation
¾Decommissioning
¾Post-mortem analysis following a failure
Underlying Approaches to 
Hazard Assessment
Historical approaches to hazard assessment
¾ None (trial & error by default)
¾ Prescriptive codes (from experience)
¾ Proactive Prescriptive (code based on best 
available information)
¾ Assess from basic principals, perhaps using 
models, predictive codes, and testing
It is important to understand that most existing codes apply to specific 
applications (for example, storage), and that codes and standards for 
new applications either do not exist, or are under development.
Elements of Hazard Assessment
Step-wise methodologies have been developed 
to prevent failures in processes or facilities 
that deal with hazardous materials:
Identify the facility/system
Identify the hazards
Conduct a hazard analysis
Estimate the consequences of failures identified
Estimate the frequency of occurrence of failures
Estimate the risks
Determine the acceptability of the risks
Develop strategies for preventing the failures and 
diminishing adverse impacts
Types of Logic:
Inductive vs. Deductive
Inductive Modeling
– Involves reasoning from individual cases to a general 
conclusion
– Induce the consequences of an event forwardly (bottom-up)
– The scenarios for an initiating event, which can have undesired 
consequences, are defined first
– Is useful in assuring that the analysis is broad enough to 
encompass all possible scenarios
– In general, provides answers to the generic question, “What 
happens if ..?”
Deductive Modeling
– Constitutes reasoning from the general to the specific
– Deduce the causes of an event backwardly (top-down)
– An event, for which causes are to be resolved, is defined first
– Has the benefit of focusing the analysis on the undesired event
– In general, answers the question, “What caused (or can cause) 
a failure or mishap to occur?”
Some Methodologies and Tools
Methodology or Tool
(Source: Goldberg et. al.)
Advantages (A) and Limitations (L)
Cause-Consequence 
Analysis
(A) Enables assessment of probabilities of coexisting faults or failures. End 
events need not be anticipated. Discrete levels of success or failure are 
distinguishable.
(L) Addresses only on initiation challenge that must be foreseen by the 
analyst. May be very subjective as to consequence severity.
Directed Graph (Digraph) 
Matrix Analysis
(A) Allows the analyst to examine the fault propagation through several 
primary and support systems. Minimal cut sets, single-point failure, and 
double-point failures can be determined with less computer computation 
than with fault tree analysis (FTA).
(L) Only identifies single point (singleton) and dual points (doubleton) of 
failure. Trained analyst, computer codes, and resources to perform this 
technique may be limited.
Energy Flow/Barrier 
Analysis
(A) Identifies hazards associated with energy sources and determines if 
barriers are adequate countermeasures.
(L) Does not address coexisting system failure modes. Fails to identify 
certain classes of hazards, (e.g., asphyxia in oxygen-deficient confined 
spaces).
Event Tree Analysis (A) Enables assessment of probabilities of coexisting faults or failures. 
Functions simultaneously in failure and success domain. End events need 
not be anticipated. Accident sequences through a system can be identified.
(L) Addresses only one initiating challenge that must be foreseen by the 
analyst. Discrete levels of success and failure are not distinguishable.
Some Methodologies and Tools (cont.)
Methodology or Tool Advantages (A) and Limitations (L)
Failure Modes and Effects 
(and Criticality) Analysis
(A) Thorough methods of identifying single point failures and their 
consequences. A criticality analysis provides a risk assessment of these 
failure modes.
(L) Can be extremely labor intensive. Does not address coexisting failure 
modes.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (A) Enables assessment of probabilities of coexisting faults or failures. 
May identify unnecessary design elements.
(L) Addresses only one undesirable event or condition that must be 
foreseen by the analyst. Comprehensive trees may be very large and 
cumbersome.
Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment
(A) Identifies and provides inventory of hazards and countermeasures. 
Provides methodology to assess overall system risks; avoids accepting 
unknown, intolerable, and senseless risks.
(L) Does not address coexisting system failure modes. Performing the 
techniques of this methodology requires skilled analysts. Techniques can 
be misapplied and results misinterpreted.
Risk Assessment Matrix 
Success Tree Analysis
(A) Provides standard tool to subjectively assess risk. Assesses probability 
of favorable outcome of system operation.
(L) Only used to assess risk of hazards, does not identify hazards. 
Addresses only one desirable event or condition that must be foreseen by 
the analysis. Comprehensive trees may be very large and cumbersome.
Challenges of Hydrogen Hazards 
Assessment
Hydrogen releases differ from other fuels due to the 
extent of interaction with surroundings:
– A leak at a point can grow into a cloud affecting a large area 
with many potential combustion hazards
– Large flammability range and low MIE promote interaction of 
released hydrogen with ignition sources
– Cryogenic issues are distinct from gaseous issues (releases can 
begin heavier-than-air and warm to become buoyant)
– Hydrogen combustion processes are often intertwined with the 
geometry of the physical system and surroundings, such that 
flame acceleration and development of dangerous 
overpressures can occur
Complexity of phenomena can obscure identification of 
hazards
Hydrogen Concerns Ranked
The primary hazards issues in descending 
order of priority:
1. Combustion
2. Pressure
3. Low Temperature
4. Hydrogen Embrittlement
5. Personnel Exposure
Hydrogen Combustion Properties of Note
In most hydrogen combustion scenarios the 
“Fire Triangle” concept is not adequate.
Human senses challenged:
¾ Flame is invisible in ambient light
¾ Produces little IR that can be felt (emissivity < 0.1)
¾ Produces UV
Flammability varies with conditions
¾ Broad range of flammable mixtures compared to most fuels
¾ Factors include: mixture, pressure, temperature, initiation energy 
and combustion process
¾ Micro-joule sources can ignite sensitive mixtures (at ambient 
conditions)
Hydrogen Combustion Properties of Note
Gaseous combustion processes are dependent on 
surrounding geometry
¾ Flame acceleration can be substantial for geometries with L/W > 8 
or flow obstructions (Nettleton 1987)
¾ Deflagrations readily approach sound speed in unburned gases 
and detonation speeds > 400 m/s to 1.5 km/s
¾ Detonation transition (DDT) in sensitive mixtures possible over 
run-up distances ~ ½ meter
¾ Overpressures for sensitive H2-air mixtures:
• Approach 8X in a closed vessel,
• 15X for deflagration and detonation,
• ~ 45X for reflected detonation,
• And larger pressures in dead-headed spaces (pressure piling) are 
possible, where X ≡ initial gas pressure.
Condensed phase mixtures can be shock sensitive with TNT-
like yields (More than nitroglycerin!)
Analysis Strategies for Hydrogen 
Combustion
Basic strategy: Seek specific concentration data for 
mixture formation and ascertain the flammability
Below the flammability limit combustion does not 
occur
Very lean or rich mixtures burn incompletely and 
flames propagate poorly
With richer fuel concentrations, ignited mixtures exhibit 
complete burning,
In more sensitive mixtures there is flame acceleration, 
And finally, in very sensitive mixtures transition to 
detonation is possible.
Analysis Strategies
for Hydrogen Combustion
Basic flammability is not the only criteria that 
determines the likelihood for a particular 
combustion process, and hence 
consequences
Some mixing scenarios involve conditions that 
create concentration gradients such as leaks 
or jets into open air filled spaces
Use a conservative approach when there is 
insufficient information
– Assume the worst case,
– Or a stoichiometric mixture, even though it may not 
be the most likely
Analysis Strategies - Initiation
Many possible initiation sources (sparks, hot surfaces, 
metal fracture, etc..)
The first goal of hazard assessment (best practice) is to 
locate potential sources of ignition, then assess their 
effect on the mixtures present.
Assume for very sensitive mixtures that an ignition 
source will always be present.
Ignition source strength influences flammability.
¾ For example: Powerful electric discharges will initiate 
combustion in mixtures at lower pressures.
For detonation, more powerful sources of shock are 
required to initiate mixtures with larger cell sizes.
Factors in the Analysis of Release
• Quantities of materials that can 
mix
• Conditions (temperature, 
pressure, mixture composition)
• Rate of release
• Extent (size) of cloud/plume
• Extent of mixing with oxidizer in 
systems where oxidizer is 
present
• Degree of confinement as 
determined by presence of 
piping, ducts, turbulence 
inducing obstacles, surfaces, 
walls, or density gradients
• Dimensions, volume
• Length to width (L/W) ratio to 
evaluate if conditions for flame 
acceleration are possible
Water vapor cloud formed from 1500 
gallons of hydrogen released into a 30 ft 
diameter pond in 30 seconds with a 7-8 
mph wind at the NASA White Sands Test 
Facility (1980)
Bounding Criteria for Combustion Assessment
Bounding Conditions Flammability Limit Comments 
LFL Air in Tubes, ID 0.8–7.5 cm ~ 3.9–5 % Upward propagation, Ambient conditions 
ID 0.9–7.5 cm ~ 6–7 % Horizontal propagation 
ID 1.4–21 cm ~ 8–9 % Downward propagation 
UFL Static Ambient Air 75% Upward propagation 
UFL Static Oxygen 95.80% Upward propagation 
Low Pressure Flammability Limit in Air 20–30 % 6 kPa absolute pressure 45 mJ spark in 2-liter 
vessel 
Low Pressure Limit in Oxygen 30–60 % 3 kPa absolute pressure, ~1 J spark 
Laminar Burning Velocity H2-Air no 
confinement at 298 K 
17% 1 m/s  
42% 3.5 m/s  (Benz et al. 1988)
64% 2.2 m/s  (Benz et al. 1988)
Bounding Criteria for Combustion Assessment
Bounding Conditions Flammability Limit Comments
Laminar Burning Velocity, H2-Air, no 
confinement at 298 K (cont.) 
9 m/s at stoichiometry
Flame Speed in Pipes, IDs 5–30 cm < 10 % No acceleration 
10 % to < 13 % 100 m/s to < 200 m/s, steady and insensitive 
to obstacles 
H2 - Air, 10 < L/D < 40 > 13 % Velocity limited to sound speed of products 
(600 to 1000 m/s) – choked flow
> 17 % DDT and CJ velocities (1700 m/s) 
Cell Size, Stoichiometric H2-Air 1.6 cm Cell size increases for non stoichiometric 
mixtures 
Cell Size, Stoichiometric H2-O2 0.16 cm Cell size increases for non stoichiometric 
mixtures 
Solid air in Liquid Hydrogen > 40 % Highly shock sensitive. Detonable with 
effects similar to high explosives 
Solid oxygen in Liquid Hydrogen If % O2 > % H2 Shock sensitive for stimuli of 100 to 250 
MPa (less than nitro-glycerine) 
Condensed Phase Issues
¾ LH2 spills dissipate by 
absorption of heat from 
the air and by heat 
transfer though gas 
near solid surfaces
¾ 40 % (LDL) solid air in 
LH2 is more shock 
sensitive than 
nitroglycerin (UDL is 
not known)
¾ LH2-LOX Mixing: Yield 
is proportional to 
surface area of mixing 
(WSTF drop tower/pan 
tests 1995)
Explosion of 50 lb LOX/LH2 at  High 
Energy Blast Facility (WSTF 1995)
Hydrogen Hazard Assessment Protocol 
(HHAP) – Basic Concept
Typically a H2 event is defined by:
– Unintended release of H2 derived energy 
(pressure or temperature differential)
– Incursion of reactive material (causing mixing)
– Release of H2(causing mixing)
into a volume or space.
System layout, design, controls and 
operations are elements that define where the 
volumes of interest are:
– Hydrogen-wetted portions of a system
– Interstitial spaces between components
– Environment surrounding the system

Volumes in a Simple Scenario
Volume Controls
1 Vessel walls, shut-
off valve, regulator
2 Cabinet wall, purge, 
vent, gas sensor 
that controls purge 
and alarm
3 Gas detector in 
room, ventilation to 
code
4 Location to code, 
GH2 freely 
dissipates
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The HHAP provides a framework and 
suggestions for developing:
¾ An analysis strategy
¾ Criteria for defining volumes
¾ A methodology for analysis
¾ A means for documentation 
Overview of Methodology
Methodology uses both inductive & deductive 
approaches. Process elements include:
Identification of volumes for analysis
Assessment of factors/potential causes that 
might contribute to an unintended release
Evaluation of characteristics of the release within 
the volume
Determination of potential hydrogen behaviors 
arising from the release
Evaluation of consequences and associated 
risks
Recommendations for mitigation
Hazards Assessment Prerequisites
• Understand analysis 
scope
• Have detailed 
design information
– Up-to-date 
schematics
– Vendor data
– Obtain specifications 
for all materials 
exposed to H2
• Have information 
necessary to evaluate all 
leak paths
• Assemble critical 
expertise:
– Subject matter experts
– Skilled meeting facilitators
– Designers
– System “owners”
– Facility managers
Initial Considerations
Before convening team:
¾System owners set 
agenda/scope of 
assessment
¾Facilitators ensure 
team is ready 
(homework done)
¾Sequester team from 
distractions
¾Provide comfortable 
environment
– Use breaks
– Provide refreshments
Questions to Consider
What failure modes involve H2?
Where can combustible mixtures form?
What ignition sources exist?
What combustion mechanisms are 
active?
What are the combustion effects?
What are the consequences?
What are the overall risks to system, 
users, mission, or business?
Process Flow Diagram
STEP 1 – Analysis Strategy
• Determine which portions of a 
system require hydrogen 
analysis
• Discern the distinct volumes in 
which hydrogen is either 
controlled (wetted)
• Or into which hydrogen or 
hydrogen related energies may 
be unintentionally released.
• Prioritize which volumes and 
elements should be considered 
first.
• Identify attributes in common 
between volumes or elements to 
minimize effort (components, 
materials, functions, etc..)
Process Flow Diagram
Step 2, for components:
¾ Identify the functional 
modes that involve 
hydrogen.
¾ Perform analysis of 
materials wetted by 
hydrogen. 
¾ Look for circumstances 
and failure modes that 
can contribute to a 
hydrogen release.
Step 2, for operations with 
personnel look for:
¾ Deviations from best practice 
that may lead to a hydrogen 
release
¾ Unnecessary exposure
¾ Interaction between 
elements, and kindling chain 
issues
¾ Other potential issues as 
required
¾ The potential for operator 
error
Component schematic 
illustrating type of 
data required for 
analysis:
¾Materials Identified
¾Analysis shows types of 
hydrogen exposure
Materials Assessment Table
with sample entries
COMPONENT ID Regulator MANUFACTURER Carleton MEDIA GH2/water
PRESSURE RATING 160 psig MODEL NO. B42487-1
NOTES
MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
Metal / Softgood / Lubricant Function within Component
304L Bellows Mount Plate, Poppet/End Plate, Bellows, Spring Seat
17-7 PH CH900 Adjusting spring, Load spring
17-4 PH H1075 Seat retainer
300 series SS Housing
PEEK Seat
Viton Manifold seal
EPR O-Ring adjusting seal
COMPONENT USE ENVIRONMENT
Use Back pressure regulator
Scenario
Operating Conditions Worst-Case Condition
Pressure Temperature Other Pressure Temperature Other
Flight 65 psia
MDP
70 to +85 °F 29.1 g 80 psia
MOP
70 to +100 °F Per Spec.
32
Materials Assessment Table
with sample entries (cont’d)
POTENTIAL FAILURE CAUSES PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
Is this cause present? Yes
Or
No
Leaks
Externally
Leaks
Internally
Fails Open
Fails
Closed
Generates
Contaminants
Other
Properties of Component Materials Diffusion/
Permeation
Y 1
Chemical Reaction N
Temperature
Compatibility
N
Expansion/
Contraction
N
H-Embrittlement Y 1 2 N/A 1
Other N
System Conditions Mechanical Stress 
/ Vibration
Y 0 0 0 1
Flow Regime N
Deformation N
Resonance N
Liquid Lockup N
Water Hammer /
Surge Pressure
N
System Catalyst 
Contamination
Y 3
Liquid Air 
Formation
N
Other N
Probability Rating: 0 = Almost Impossible 1 = Remotely Possible 2 = Possible 3 = Probable 4 = Highly Probable
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Mixing and Combustion
Identify the cause of the hydrogen release
Evaluate potential hydrogen mixture(s) that 
may arise within the volume
Assess potential effects for non-ignition and 
combustion events:
¾Evaluate which non-ignition events are possible
¾Fire, deflagration, detonation may all be possible
¾Evaluate potential combustion processes and 
effects in the context of the mixing event and 
scenario confinement
• Evaluate flammability
• Ignition mechanisms based on the elements and other 
ignition sources present in the volume
Assessment Tasks
Note controls or controlling factors that mitigate 
a hazard as well as circumstances that might 
interfere with the controls. Summarize the effect 
on potential reactions 
Assess the likelihood from ignition criteria
Evaluate the severity of the reaction effect from 
established criteria
Consider potential mitigations for unacceptable 
hazards and deleterious effects and note 
proposed controls
Assess mitigated reaction effects
Assessment of Risk of Ignition
FlammableAll present and all are strongly
active
4Highly Probable
FlammableAll present and some are strongly
active
3Probable
FlammableAll present and active2Possible
Nonflammable
Flammable
All present
Not at all present
1Remotely Possible
NonflammableNot at all present0Not Possible
Mixture FlammabilityCharacteristic Elements
CriteriaCodeIgnition Rating
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Assessment Criteria for Event Severity
There is a kindling chain, 
ignition probabilities are 
greater than 0, and 
direct exposure is 
required for operation
No portion of the system 
can be salvaged—total 
loss
Production, storage, 
transportation, 
distribution, or use as 
applicable rendered 
impossible—major unit 
is lost
Personnel suffer death or 
multiple injuries
DCatastrophic
There is a kindling chain, 
and ignition 
probabilities are greater 
than 0. In addition, 
access is limited by a 
shield or distance, but 
there are no formal 
access procedures or 
barricades used
Two or more major 
subsystems are 
damaged. This condition 
requires extensive 
maintenance
Production, storage, 
transportation, 
distribution, or use as 
applicable impaired 
seriously
Personnel may be injured 
(1) operating the system, 
(2) maintaining the 
system, or (3) by being 
in the vicinity of the 
system
CCritical
There is a kindling chain, 
and ignition 
probabilities are greater 
than 0. In addition, 
access to the area is 
controlled in a formally 
documented procedure 
and barricades are used
No more than one 
component or subsystem 
damaged. This condition 
is either repairable or 
replaceable within an 
acceptable time frame 
on site
Mission/Objective can be 
accomplished by using 
available redundant 
operational options, or 
resumed after 
acceptable repair
Personnel-injuring factors 
can be controlled by 
automatic devices, 
warning devices, or 
special operating 
procedures
BMarginal
There is no personnel 
access, kindling chain, 
or ignition probability 
greater than 0
No unacceptable damage 
to the system
No unacceptable effect on 
production, storage, 
transportation, 
distribution, or use as 
applicable
No injury to personnelANegligible
ExampleFunctional CapabilitySystem ObjectivesPersonnel SafetyCodeRating
Sample Hazard Control Table
Item Release Cause Seal fails on flange for pipe containing 30 psi, 100 K cold hydrogen gas
1 Release Description Cryogenic gas release into open space. No further confinement in exclusion zone
Hazard Consideration Existing
Controls
Reaction Effect Code Recommended
Action/Control
Final
Code
STATUS
Cold Exposure Use appropriate 
PPE
None. Frostbite hazard 
mitigated
1 A None 1 A
Gas/Liquid Release Hydrogen gas 
detector above 
flange
Detector will trigger 3 A None 3 A
Pressurized Release/Jet None None
Heat None None
Flame None Ignition is possible and 
may be triggered by 
approaching personnel. 
Hazard would include 
burns
2 B Upon alarm, appropriate safing 
procedures must be followed. 
Regardless of system status, 
personnel should approach 
with caution. Operational 
control prevents hazard to 
personnel
2 A Accept, 
as noted
Cloud Fire None Will dissipate 0 None
Jet Fire None Insufficient pressure 0 None
Deflagration None Insufficient mixture 0 None
Gas Detonation None No ignition source 0 None
Condensed Detonation None No mixture 0 None
Other Not identified
N
o
n
-
I
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
f
o
r
C
o
m
b
u
s
t
i
o
n
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
e
s
Code:  0 Not possible 1 Remotely Possible 2 Possible 3 Probable 4 Highly Probable
A Negligible B Marginal C Critical D Catastrophic
Summary – What is Achieved?
9Hydrogen scenarios are systematically identified 
using a combination of deductive and inductive 
approaches
9Assessment specifically tailored for hydrogen 
behavior:
Organized around volumes into which hydrogen 
release can occur
Analysis of mixing specifics, of flammability, available 
ignition sources, surrounding confinement, and 
combustion process together define the hazard
Mitigations built into the system are recognized
9Non-combustion and combustion hazards are 
identified
Summary – What is Achieved?
9Severity and qualitative risk are assessed
9New mitigations are captured
9This information is systematically organized 
and documented
The end product is a compilation of 
hazards, mitigations, & associated 
factors to facilitate decision making 
and achieve best practice!
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